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MITIGATING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:
DESIGNING A DYNAMIC CONVENTION TO
COMBAT A DYNAMIC RISK
PHILLIP M. KANNAN*
Some risks are plainly acceptable and others are plainly
unacceptable.1
INTRODUCTION
The risk of an event which can cause harm is defined as the
probability that the event will occur and cause harm multiplied by
the magnitude of the harm;2 this can be formally represented as:
Risk = (Probability of Occurrence of Harm) x (Magnitude of Harm).3
As both of these factors increase, the risk tends to move into the “plainly
unacceptable” category. If, for a particular risk, the probability of harm
is beyond reasonable doubt, and the magnitude of harm is greater than
that caused by any natural disaster in recorded history, that risk is
plainly unacceptable. The risk created by the current and projected con-
centrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere resulting from anthro-
pogenic emissions is the product of just such a probability multiplied by
just such a magnitude.4
* Distinguished Lecturer and Legal-Scholar-in-Residence, Colorado College.
1 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
2 This definition of risk was used by Judge Learned Hand in his famous opinion in the
Carroll Towing case. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (stating that, “[the allocation of liability for a breakaway barge] is a function of
three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the
resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to
bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P;
the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L mul-
tiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL”).
3 See EPA, RISK ASSESSMENT: BASIC INFORMATION, available at http://www.epa.gov
/riskassessment/basicinformation.htm. See also Celia Campbell-Mohn and John S.
Applegate, Learning from NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 93, 95 (1999) (describing risk assessment as a “process for calculating the
probability and magnitude of identified adverse effects”).
4 See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
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Merely proclaiming that a particular risk is unacceptable does not
lessen it. To mitigate a risk, the factors that compose it must be reduced;
this can be done by reducing both of them or by reducing one in a way that
overcompensates for any increase in the other.5 Thus, to mitigate the risk
created by greenhouse gas emissions one must reduce the probability of
the harm they create or the magnitude of that harm. The concentration
of greenhouse gases can be decreased by reducing the rate of greenhouse
gas emissions or by increasing the rate of their removal.6 Either or both
of these actions will allow the concentration to go down over time, and
that will reduce both the probability and the magnitude of the harm asso-
ciated with greenhouse gas emissions. Tragically, the states of the world
have not succeeded in developing and implementing a regime to reduce
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.7 The purpose
of this article is to explore means that can lead to such a regime.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I outlines the data demon-
strating both the probability of harm and the magnitude of harm caused
by past, current, and projected anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
Section II gives an overview of the efforts the international community has
made to date to control this risk. It includes a discussion of the strengths
and weaknesses of these efforts and their likelihood of success. Sections III
and IV analyze the approach taken by the international community to pro-
tect a different global commons, namely, straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks in the high seas. Section V turns the same analytical
focus applied to the regime to protect these fish stocks to the one adopted
by the international community to protect the ozone layer in the atmo-
sphere from ozone depleting chemicals. Section VI argues that some, but
not all, of the innovative approaches taken in treaties intended to protect
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in the high seas
and the ozone layer in the atmosphere can be adapted to produce a re-
gime for reducing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmo-
sphere and the risk they pose. It includes pro forma treaty language as
5 Keith J. Crocker, Risk and Risk Management, in THE ECONOMICS OF RISK 9, 13 (Donald
J. Meyer, ed., 2003).
6 Detlef P. van Vuuren et al., Stabilizing Greenhouse Gas Concentrations at Low Levels:
An Assessment of Reduction Strategies and Costs, 81 CLIMATIC CHANGE 119, 120 (2007),
available at http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/chem/2008-0422-200652/NWS-E-2007-29.pdf;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WORKING GROUP I: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1
/en/faq-10-3.html.
7 See infra Part II (describing the international response to climate change since 1994).
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suggestions for actually implementing these adaptations. The Conclusion
includes closing suggestions.
I. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The sun emits energy in the form of short wavelengths called
ultraviolet radiation.8 This form of energy might either pass through the
earth’s atmosphere or be reflected by the earth’s atmosphere.9 If it passes
through the atmosphere, it can either be reflected by the earth or ab-
sorbed by the earth’s surface.10 If it is absorbed, it warms the earth’s
surface and the lower atmosphere.11 The earth’s surface then emits en-
ergy into the atmosphere in the form of infrared radiation, some of which
is absorbed in the atmosphere and re-emitted in all directions by chemical
compounds called greenhouse gases.12 Re-emission of this infrared radi-
ation further warms the earth’s surface and the lower atmosphere.13
The most important greenhouse gases are water vapor, carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).14 Green-
house gases are also referred to as heat-trapping gases.15 Anthropogenic
emissions of these gases have increased sharply since pre-industrial
times.16 The increase has been particularly large in recent times; for
example, the increase was seventy percent between 1970 and 2004.17 In
that period, “global emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6,
weighted by their global warming potential (“GWP”), have increased by
70% (24% between 1990 and 2004), from 28.7 to 49 gigatonnes of carbon
8 The Sun and Its Energy, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://telstar.ote.cmu.edu/environ/m3
/s2/02sun.shtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
9 EPA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: BACK TO BASICS,
available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/Climate_Basics.pdf.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL WARMING, available at http://
www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/global-warming-faq.html.
16 EPA, ATMOSPHERE CHANGES, available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science
/recentac.html.
17 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 3, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report
/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf.
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dioxide equivalents (GtCO2-eq).”18 Atmospheric concentrations of these
greenhouse gases have increased as a result of these rising emission rates.
In 2009, the U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program reported: “As
a result of human activities, the present carbon dioxide concentration of
about 385 ppm [parts per million] is about 30 percent above the highest
level over at least the last 800,000 years.”19 The Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) estimates this concentration is increasing by approximate-
ly 1.9 parts per million per year.20 The increased atmospheric concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases result in more infrared radiation being absorbed
and re-emitted into the atmosphere by these gases.21
Re-emission of infrared radiation by greenhouse gases is occurring
at an increased rate, and the global average temperature is increasing as
a result. The United States Global Change Research Program issued a re-
port to the President and to the Congress on behalf of the National Science
and Technology Council entitled Global Climate Change Impacts in the
United States which stated:
Observations show that warming of the climate is unequiv-
ocal. The global warming observed over the past 50 years is
due primarily to human-induced emissions of heat-trapping
gases. These emissions come mainly from the burning of fos-
sil fuels (coal, oil, and gas), with important contributions
from the clearing of forests, agricultural practices, and other
activities. Warming over this century is projected to be con-
siderably greater than over the last century. The global av-
erage temperature since 1900 has risen by about 1.5° F.
By 2100, it is projected to rise another 2° F to 11.5° F.22
The same conclusion was reached by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, which stated that “[w]arming of the climate system is
unequivocal . . .”23 and that “[t]here is very high confidence that the net
18 Id.
19 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 13 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009), available at http://downloads
.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf.
20 EPA, ATMOSPHERE CHANGES, available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science
/recentac.html.
21 Id.
22 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 19, at 9.
23 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SYNTHESIS REPORT, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, 30, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment
-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
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effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.”24 Thus,
based on the best scientific analyses and opinions, the probability of harm
from the current and projected levels of greenhouse gas emissions is
unequivocal, that is, beyond reasonable doubt.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has employed
computer models to project the impacts these global average temperature
changes will produce.25 Some of these projections of the magnitudes of the
harm that will result from the current and expected levels of greenhouse
gas emissions are as follows:
1. WATER—“Hundreds of millions of people exposed
to increased water stress”;
2. ECOSYSTEMS—“Up to 30% of species at increas-
ing risk of extinction” and “Widespread coral mor-
tality” and “Increasing species range shifts and
wildfire risk”;
3. FOOD—“Productivity of all cereals decreases in
low altitudes”;
4. COASTS—“Increased damage from floods and
storms” and “About 30% of coastal wetlands lost”
and “Millions more people could experience coastal
flooding each year”; and
5. HEALTH—“Increasing burden from malnutrition,
diarrheal, cardio-respiratory and infectious dis-
eases” and “Increased morbidity and mortality from
heat waves, floods and droughts” and “Changed
distribution of some disease vectors.”26
The countries of the international community understand that
they are facing a risk that is virtually certain to occur and cause harm of
unprecedented magnitude.27 They understand that collective action is
required to mitigate this risk.28 They understand that the objective of
the collective action must be the reduction of the concentration of green-
house gases in the atmosphere through reduced emission and increased
24 Id. at 5.
25 See id. at 45 (“Advances in climate change modeling now enable best estimates and
likely assessed uncertainty ranges to be given for projected warming for different emis-
sions scenarios.”).
26 Id. at 10.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 62.
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absorption.29 Yet, as the next section demonstrates, they have failed to
agree on a means to achieve that end.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE RISKS POSED BY GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS
The first direct action taken by the international community to mit-
igate the risk created by global climate change was to negotiate and bring
into force on March 21, 1994 the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change.30 This treaty has had broad acceptance, with 195
parties as of June 20, 2011.31
The universal embrace of the treaty reflects its basic approach,
which can be characterized as a velvet glove with no fist, iron or otherwise,
inside.32 The use of this metaphor, however, should not be understood to
imply that UNFCCC was or is inconsequential. It articulated the axioms
for the diplomatic process aimed at achieving the collective action neces-
sary to reduce the threat of global climate change.33 After UNFCCC came
into force, future negotiations regarding global climate change could not
start with a clean slate.34
Article 2 states the objective of the treaty and the diplomatic process
it sets in motion to be the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.”35 It thereby accepts a pragmatic goal
rather than the idealistic one of returning to pre-industrial revolution con-
centrations of greenhouse gases.
Article 3 adopts a strong version of the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility by calling on developed Parties to take the
29 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
30 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; see also Ranee
Khooshie Lal Panjabi, Can International Law Improve the Climate? An Analysis of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Signed at the Rio Summit in
1992, 18 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 491 (1993) (discussing the history of the negotiations
leading to the UNFCCC and analyzing its main provisions).
31 Status of Ratification, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status
_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
32 See Panjabi, supra note 30, at 528 (describing the obligations under the UNFCCC as
“unfortunately so vague as to be almost without substance”).
33 UNFCCC, supra note 30, preamble, at 1–3.
34 Status of Ratification, UNFCCC, supra note 31 (noting that 194 states and one regional
economic integration organization are parties to the Convention).
35 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 2.
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lead in combating global climate change.36 The common but differentiated
responsibility principle has been adopted extensively in international en-
vironmental law and policy.37 It is justified as follows in the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development:
In view of the different contribution to global environ-
mental degradation, States have common but differenti-
ated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge
the responsibility that they bear in the international pur-
suit of sustainable development in view of the pressures
their societies place on the global environment and of the
technologies and financial resources they command.38
One way this principle is implemented in UNFCCC is by dividing states
into Annex I Parties, which are the forty-one most economically developed
states, and non–Annex I Parties.39 Both categories of parties must pur-
sue the common objective stated in article 2; however, Annex I Parties
“should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse ef-
fects thereof.”40 Each developed party agrees to “adopt national policies
and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting
and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”41 In addition,
Annex I Parties must submit detailed information on their policies “with
the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels [of green-
house gas emissions].”42 These subsections of UNFCCC clearly do not set
binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions, but they are the strongest
36 Id. at art. 3(1) (“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the ad-
verse effects thereof.”). In fact, the obligations of developing parties are dependent upon
“the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under
the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology . . . .” Id. at art. 4(7).
37 See Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibility in International
Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 276 (2004) (providing a discussion of the adoption of the common
but differentiated responsibility principle in environmental conventions).
38 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (June 14, 1992).
39 Id. at Annex I.
40 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 3(1).
41 Id. art. 4(2).
42 Id. art. 4(2)(b) (emphasis added).
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provisions in the treaty on this critical point. Annex II Parties, which are
the Annex I Parties except those that are undergoing the process of tran-
sition to a market economy, are required to “provide new and additional
financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing
country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12,
paragraph 1.”43
All parties are required to compile and submit to the Conference
of Parties a national inventory of anthropogenic sources and sinks of all
greenhouse gases listed in the treaty, adopt plans to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions, and develop plans for coastal zone management.44 Annex II
parties are obligated to assist non–Annex I Parties that are “particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of
adaptation” and also to assist non–Annex I parties to obtain environmental-
ly sound technologies that will assist them in complying with UNFCCC.45
In 1995 in Berlin, the Conference of Parties at its first meeting
agreed on a plan aimed at imposing binding caps on the greenhouse gas
emissions of some parties.46 The strategy to accomplish this objective was
contained in a document known as the Berlin Mandate.47 This strategy
sharpened and institutionalized the differentiation between Annex I and
non–Annex I Parties by adopting explicit provisions stating what would
be required of Annex I Parties and what could not be required of non–
Annex I Parties.48 First, it established the objective of strengthening the
commitments of Annex I Parties to include “quantified limitations and
reduction objectives within specified time-frames.”49 This was to be
achieved through a protocol that imposed binding limits on greenhouse
gas emissions on a stated schedule for all Annex I Parties.50 Second, the
Berlin Mandate included the requirement that the protocol could “[n]ot
introduce any new commitments for [non–Annex I] Parties . . . .”51
43 Id. art. 4(3).
44 Id. art. 4(1)(a), (b), (e).
45 Id. art. 4(4)–(5). The list of Annex II parties consists of those Annex I parties that are
not undergoing the transition to a market economy. See id. at Annex I and Annex II.
46 Clare Breindenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT’L. L. 315, 318 (1998).
47 Id.
48 Conclusion of Outstanding Issues and Adoption of Decisions, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/
L.14 ¶ 2(a)–(b) (April 7, 1995) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].
49 Id. ¶ 2(a).
50 Id. ¶ 4.
51 Id. ¶ 2(b).
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The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change52 was negotiated and opened for signatures in 1998
as a step in the process outlined in the Berlin Mandate.53 The most sig-
nificant new component of the Kyoto Protocol is the inclusion of binding
limits on greenhouse gas emissions for industrialized parties.54 These lim-
its are imposed in a way that fulfills the two basic promises in the Berlin
Mandate. As for the first one, article 3 requires Annex I Parties to “ensure
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitations and
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B . . . .”55 Thus, a state that
becomes a party to the Kyoto Protocol and is listed in Annex B has a bind-
ing cap on its greenhouse gas emissions. As for the second promise in the
Berlin Mandate, article 10, when establishing obligations for all parties,
states that these obligations are created “without introducing any new
commitments for Parties not included in Annex I . . . .”56
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility in the
international community’s response to global climate change was born in
the UNFCCC, memorialized in the Berlin Mandate, and given substance
in the Kyoto Protocol. This success in negotiating, however, has proven
to be a barrier to achieving the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas
concentrations as stated in the UNFCCC.57 The differentiation became
so great that the common responsibility could not be met.58 Inclusion of
this version of common but differentiated responsibility meant that the
Kyoto Protocol failed to be a means of marshaling collective action. The
United States, which was the largest emitter of greenhouse gases until
2005 or 2006, when it was surpassed by China,59 refused to become a party.
First, on July 25, 1997, the U.S. Senate passed a non-binding resolution
sponsored by Senator Robert Byrd recognizing this failure: “. . . [T]he
52 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
53 See Breidenich, supra note 46, at 315–19 (summarizing the negotiations leading to the
Kyoto Protocol).
54 Id. at 315.
55 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 3(1).
56 Id. art. 10.
57 See infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text (describing the lack of emissions cap for
emerging industrial powers such as China and India).
58 See id.
59 JANE A. LEGGETT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34659, CHINA’S GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND MITIGATION POLICIES 5, 8 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/row/RL34659.pdf.
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exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need
for global action on climate change and is environmentally flawed . . . .”60
The resolution stated as the sense of the Senate that the United States
should not be a party to any protocol that set emission limits and sched-
ules for Annex I Parties unless limits and schedules were also set for non–
Annex I Parties.61 Then, the Bush administration repudiated the Kyoto
Protocol in 2001.62 The political leaders of the United States viewed the
Kyoto Protocol as institutionalizing free rider status.63
When the Berlin Mandate and the Kyoto Protocol prohibited the
international community from imposing caps on greenhouse gas emis-
sions for all non–Annex I Parties, the drafters ignored the reality that
the global economy is a dynamic system.64 These prohibitions were an at-
tempt to impose fixed points in that constantly changing system; this was
unrealistic. Consider China, for example. In 1990 when the UNFCCC was
being negotiated, China was considered a developing state and thus not
an Annex I Party.65 At that time, this was a reasonable decision. But the
Chinese economy has expanded dramatically in the past twenty-one years.
During that period, China’s economy has expanded at an average annual
rate of over 9.3%.66 Applying the formula for computing doubling time,67
this would mean that in this twenty-one-year time period, China’s econo-
my doubled, then doubled a second time, and then doubled a third time.
This means that at the end of this twenty-one-year period, China’s econ-
omy was approximately eight times, that is 800%, the size it was at the
beginning. This industrial growth was paralleled by urbanization beyond
60 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997), 143 CONG. REC. S8138-39 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)
(enacted).
61 Id.
62 Jutta Brunnée, Europe, the United States, and the Global Climate Regime: All Together
Now?, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 1, 4 (2008) (discussing the decision of President Bush
to reject the Kyoto Protocol and the consequences of that decision). See also Andrew C.
Revkin, Climate Talks Will Shift Focus From Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A8.
63 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S8117 (daily ed. July 25, 1997) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd,
criticizing the Protocol as giving developing states a “free pass”).
64 Breidenich, supra note 46, at 326.
65 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at Annex I.
66 Background Note: China, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r
/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (“[China] has sustained average economic growth of over 9.3% since
1989.”); see also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 59, at 1 (“Between 1979 and 2007, the Chinese
economy grew at an average annual rate of 9.8%.”).
67 Understanding Exponential Growth, UNIV. OF OREGON, http://zebu.uoregon.edu/2003
/es202/lec06.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (stating and deriving the formula: doubling
time = 70/n where n = percent of growth rate). For China in the twenty-one-year period
in which its annual economic growth rate was approximately ten percent, the formula is
70/10 = 7, which means the economy doubled approximately every seven years.
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any seen in human history.68 China has become the world’s second-
largest economy.69 China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse
gases.70 Moreover, “China’s . . . emissions are projected to grow compared
to current levels by about 45 percent . . . by 2020.”71 Taking into account the
factors that justify differential treatment, namely, pressure placed on the
global environment and technologies and financial resources,72 it is no lon-
ger reasonable to exclude China from Annex I. The differentiated responsi-
bility for China is no longer consistent with the objectives of the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol, and yet, because a static subsystem was created
in a dynamic system, China has treaty rights to non–Annex I status.
Because of the way the common but differentiated responsibility
principle was implemented in the Kyoto Protocol, China, which emitted
approximately seventeen percent of the total amount of greenhouse gas-
es in 2005,73 has no cap.74 It is free to continue to bring online two coal-
fired power plants per week.75 These same rights exist for the other
nation with a billion-plus population, India,76 which was the third-largest
emitter of greenhouse gases in 2005;77 its greenhouse gas emissions
are projected to increase by forty-seven percent over today’s level by
68 Thomas J. Campanella, Megacities: China’s Urban Challenges, BBC NEWS (June 20,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-13799997 (“Three decades of
sustained economic growth, concentrated along the booming coast, has lured millions
from the impoverished Chinese countryside. This great migration—unprecedented in
human history—has put 46 Chinese cities over the one million mark since 1992, out of
a national total of 102.”).
69 China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second Biggest Economy, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321.
70 Keith Bradsher, Power vs. Profit, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at B1 (“. . . China is al-
ready the world’s largest emitter [of greenhouse gases].”).
71 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: UNDERSTANDING AND
RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: OVERVIEW 6 (2011), available at http://www
.pewclimate.org/docUploads/climate101-overview.pdf.
72 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 38, at princ. 7.
73 LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 59, at 8.
74 See Breidenich, supra note 46, at 325–26 (noting that the Berlin Mandate precluded
the introduction of new commitments for developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol).
75 Roger Harrabin, China Building More Power Plants, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2007), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6769743.stm. Compare this to the rate at which the United States
brings coal-fired power plants on line; the Department of Energy reported that as follows:
“6,682 MW (11 plants) have become operational during 2010 as of December 2010; this is
the highest level of coal-fired plants Commissioned in 25 years (since 1985).” ERIK SHUSTER,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TRACKING NEW COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS, 2010 (2011), available
at http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/ncp.pdf.
76 India Census: Population Goes up to 1.21 Bn, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12916888.
77 LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 59, at 8.
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2020.78 These rights also exist for other major economies such as Indonesia,
Brazil, Mexico, Vietnam, and South Korea.79 Because China and other states
with significant levels of greenhouse gas emissions have no caps, the United
States, which emitted approximately seventeen percent of the total global
greenhouse gases in 2005,80 has refused to agree to limit its greenhouse
gas emissions. For the United States, the common but differentiated re-
sponsibility provision and the Berlin Mandate were the poison pill for the
global climate change regime.81 Saddled with the current version of the
common but differentiated principle, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
have little chance of achieving their goal of “stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”82 In fact, the
International Energy Agency reported that CO2 emissions were at a re-
cord level of 30.6 gigatonnes in 2010, increasing by five percent above the
previous record set in 2008, before the global recession.83 This makes the
probability of holding the temperature increase to two degrees Celsius,
the limit of stabilization, unlikely.84
The voluntary goals set by the parties to the UNFCCC in the
Copenhagen Accord,85 even if carried out, will not achieve the desired sta-
bilization. This was the conclusion of the United Nations Environmental
Programme86 and Congressional Research Service.87 The same conclusion
78 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 71, at 6.
79 BBVA RESEARCH, CROSS-COUNTRY EMERGING MARKETS ANALYSIS: ECONOMIC WATCH 1
(2010), available at http://www.bbvaresearch.com/KETD/fbin/mult/EM_Watch_151110_i
_rev_260711_tcm348-235907.pdf.
80 LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 59, at 8.
81 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
82 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 2.
83 Prospect of Limiting Global Increases in Temperature to 2°C is Getting Bleaker, INT’L
ENERGY AGENCY (May 30, 2011), http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1959.
84 Global Carbon Emissions Reach Record, Says IEA, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2011), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-13595174 (quoting Faith Birol of the International
Energy Agency: “The world has edged incredibly close to the level of emissions that should
not be reached until 2020 if the 2C target is to be attained.”).
85 Copenhagen Accord, Decision -/CP.15 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/files
/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf.
86 UNITED NATIONS ENVTL. PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT: ARE THE
COPENHAGEN ACCORD PLEDGES SUFFICIENT TO LIMIT GLOBAL WARMING TO 2°C OR
1.5°C? TECHNICAL SUMMARY (2010), available at http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks
/emissionsgapreport/pdfs/EMISSIONS_GAP_TECHNICAL_SUMMARY.pdf (“If the lowest-
ambition pledges were implemented in a ‘lenient’ fashion, emissions could be lowered
slightly to 53 GtCO2e (range 52–57 GtCO2e) leaving a significant gap of 9 GtCO2e.”).
87 LARRY PARKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30023, U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY: EVOLVING VIEWS ON COST, COMPETITIVENESS, AND COMPREHENSIVENESS 12, 15
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holds for the reduction targets and actions adopted by the parties in the
Cancun Agreements.88
Even though the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen
Accord, and the Cancun Agreements taken together are unlikely to
achieve the stabilization set as the objective in 1992, they must not be
abandoned. Each of these agreements can result in a significant reduc-
tion in global greenhouse gas emissions, which cumulatively can slow the
rate of global climate change.89 The benefit of slowing the pace of this harm
was recognized in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.90
In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether EPA’s refusal to reg-
ulate greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles under the Clean Air
Act contributed to the injuries to Massachusetts caused by global climate
change.91 EPA argued that its decision not to regulate these emissions
contributed insignificantly to these injuries:
For the same reason, EPA does not believe that any realistic
possibility exists that the relief petitioners [Massachusetts]
seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy their
injuries. That is especially so because predicted increases in
greenhouse gas emissions from developing nations, partic-
ularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal do-
mestic decrease.92
The Court rejected EPA’s argument: “Nor is it dispositive that developing
countries such as China and India are poised to increase greenhouse gas
emissions substantially over the next century: A reduction in domestic
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30024.pdf (“[The Copenhagen
Accord] . . . set a goal of reducing global emissions ‘so as to hold the increase in global
temperature below 2 degrees C’ . . . . [I]t remains to be seen what the Copenhagen
agreement will lead to; just as it remains to be seen what the world’s two largest
emitters, China and the United States, will do—whether the goals that they have sub-
mitted under the Copenhagen agreement will be met.”).
88 What Governments Will Do in 2011, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Cancun Agreements, http://cancun.unfccc.int/what-governments-will-do-in-2011/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2012) (“It is also important to keep in mind that, as UN analysis shows,
the emissions reduction targets and actions announced in Cancun, although they are the
most ambitious global efforts to date, are inadequate in the longer term to keep the world
under the agreed maximum global temperature rise of two degrees.”).
89 Greenhouse Gases & Climate Change, MASS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.mass
.gov/dep/air/climate (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
90 Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007).
91 Id. at 523.
92 Id. at 523–24.
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emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter
what happens elsewhere.”93
The slowing of the pace of greenhouse gas emissions that is pos-
sible under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord,
and the Cancun Agreements will give the international community more
time to devise a more effective collective response. The regime created by
these agreements, however, will not achieve its stated objective because
these treaties ignore the ecological reality created by the economic reali-
ty of the explosive growth of China, India, and other major economies.94
The challenge is to strengthen the mechanisms in the existing regime,
which only slow the pace of harm, so that they become collective actions
that, in fact, mitigate global climate change and achieve the objective of
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”95 Help in meeting this challenge can be found in other treaties
that are designed to prevent tragedies from befalling other commons.96 To
that end, the next section explores approaches taken in treaties to protect
global commons consisting of various fish stocks that occur in the high
seas. This analysis will show that this regime, like the existing one for
global climate change, is flawed because it does not bind all states that
have the economic and technical resources to cause the collapse of the
commons. However, included in the treaties to conserve fish stocks in the
high seas are approaches that could be adopted in the fight against global
climate change.
III. CONSERVATION OF FISH STOCKS IN THE HIGH SEAS
The high seas are classic examples of commons; no state claims
sovereignty over them.97 The various species of living marine resources
that spend some of their lives in the high seas are also commons.98 Without
effective collective action, these commons will be at high risk of suffering
93 Id. at 525–26 (emphasis added).
94 See supra notes 71–92 and accompanying text.
95 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 2.
96 See infra notes 97–121 and accompanying text.
97 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) (lamenting that
maritime nations “respond automatically to the shibboleth of the ‘freedom of the seas’ ”).
98 See id. (explaining how treating various ocean species, including fish and whales, as
commons brings them closer to extinction).
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the tragedy that threatens all commons.99 The data from the U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) suggest that too often, the threat
has become reality. Based on the 2005 FAO report, “Review of the State
of World Marine Fisheries Resources,” the FAO concluded: “Of the 600
marine fish stocks monitored by FAO: 3% are underexploited, 20% are
moderately exploited, 52% are fully exploited, 17% are overexploited, 7%
are depleted, and 1% are recovering from depletion.”100 Each of these fish
stocks is a commons; seventy-seven percent of these 600 commons will
end in tragedy unless exploitation of them is reduced and controlled.101
Attempts to impose necessary controls, however, conflict with the prin-
ciple of mare liberum, the freedom of the high seas.102 The resolution of
this conflict requires the curtailing of the principle of mare liberum, and
thus, the limiting of the sovereignty of all states that engage in fishing
on the high seas.103 This conflict can be envisioned as one between sus-
tainable development of the fish stocks and mare liberum.104 The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)105 provides the
means for resolving this conflict.106
99 Id. at 1244.
100 U.N. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., GENERAL SITUATION OF WORLD FISH STOCKS [hereinafter
FAO], available at http://www.fao.org/newsroom/common/ecg/1000505/en/stocks.pdf. For a
more detailed analysis, see Jorge Csirke, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., FAO MARINE RES. SERV.,
FISHERY RES. DIV., REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE WORLD MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES,
FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 457 11 (2005), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao
/007/y5852e/Y5852E00.pdf.
101 Id. at 1.
102 Rebecca Bratspies, Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Limits
of International Law, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 213, 213–14 (2001) (“This Article starts
from the premise that resolution of the straddling stock dilemma necessarily involves
recognition of the conflict between the demands of environmental stewardship and
mare liberum.”).
103 Chad J. McGuire, UNCLOS and the High Seas: Problems and Suggested Solutions to
the Creation of a Common Pool, in SELECTED WORKS OF CHAD J. MCGUIRE (2003), available
at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=chad_mcguire (last
visited Jan. 30, 2012).
104 See, e.g., Bratspies, supra note 102.
105 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
21 I.L.M. 1261, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts
/unclos/unclos_e.pdf [hereinafter UNCLOS].
106 Candace L. Bates, U.S. Ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Passive Acceptance Is Not Enough to Protect U.S. Property Interests, 31 N.C. J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 745, 788 (2006) (discussing the negotiations leading to UNCLOS and
its benefits).
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UNCLOS recognizes the general principle of the freedom of the
high seas and the right of all states to fish on the high seas,107 but im-
poses restraints on that right:
All States have the right for their nationals to engage
in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) their treaty
obligations; (b) the rights and duties as well as the in-
terests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in article
63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67; and (c) the provi-
sions of this section [section 2 (Articles 116–120)].108
One of the most important of these obligations imposed on all
states in section 2 of UNCLOS is “the duty to take, or to co-operate with
other States in taking, such measures for their respective nations as may
be necessary for conservation of the living resources of the high seas.”109
This duty includes the obligation to “cooperate to establish subregional
or regional fisheries organizations to this end,”110 and to set allowable
catch limits.111
The exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) is defined as a 200 nautical
mile breadth as measured from the coastal baseline.112 The coastal state
has sovereignty and jurisdiction over this area; it is no longer part of the
high seas.113 In its EEZ, the coastal state has conservation and manage-
ment duties including setting allowable catch limits114 and preventing
over-exploitation of living resources.115
For fish stocks that occur in more than one EEZ, UNCLOS recog-
nizes the need for cooperation by all of those coastal states in protecting
such fish stocks, which are called straddling fish stocks. Using language
that imposes a procedural rather than a substantive obligation, UNCLOS
requires all of these states to “seek . . . to agree upon the measures neces-
sary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such
stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part.”116
107 UNCLOS, supra note 105, at art. 87 (specifically requiring that the right to fish “be
exercised by all States with due regard for the interest of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas . . .”).
108 Id. art. 116.
109 Id. art. 117.
110 Id. art. 118.
111 Id. art. 119.
112 Id. art. 57.
113 UNCLOS supra note 105, at art. 56(1)(a).
114 Id. art. 61(1).
115 Id. art. 61(2).
116 Id. art. 63(1).
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UNCLOS also attempts to allocate authority to regulate fish stocks,
called highly migratory species, which occur in both the EEZ of a state and
in the adjacent high seas.117 The coastal states and the states fishing these
stocks are obligated to “seek . . . to agree upon the measures necessary for
the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.”118
In UNCLOS articles regarding straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks quoted in the previous two paragraphs, UNCLOS is
struggling with the threat to commons that arises because of sovereignty
and the rights of sovereigns.119 This is analogous to the challenge the inter-
national community is facing today regarding global climate change, in
which sovereign states claim that, included in their sovereignty, is the
right to emit greenhouse gases unconstrained by international law.120 The
initial approaches taken by the international community in mitigating
these problems are, like the problems themselves, analogous. As a first
step in both cases, procedures are put in place and voluntary efforts are
encouraged to mitigate the environmental harm. In UNCLOS in the sec-
tions quoted in the two preceding paragraphs, the states are to “seek to
agree” on necessary conservation measures; however, there are no sub-
stantive requirements or standards. In the UNFCCC, the analogous pro-
visions are found in article 4. There are found the core mitigation and
adaptation commitments by non–Annex I Parties:
Take climate change considerations into account, to the
extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and
environmental policies and actions, and employ appropri-
ate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated
and determined nationally, with a view to minimize ad-
verse effects on the economy, on public health and on the
quality of the environment, of projects or measures under-
taken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change.121
117 Id. art. 63(2).
118 Id.
119 Daniel Hollis, United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (June 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://eoearth.org/article/United
_Nations_Convention_on_Law_of_the_Sea_(UNCLOS),_1982; see UNCLOS, supra note 105,
at preamble (“[r]ecognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with
due regard to the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which
will facilitate international communications, and will promote the peaceful uses of the
seas and oceans . . .”).
120 See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
121 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 4(1)(f).
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For Annex I Parties, the commitment is to provide information on policies
“with the aim of returning” to 1990 levels of anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions.122 The phrases “to the extent feasible,” “with a view,” and
“with the aim” demonstrate the same lack of substance as does the “seek
to agree” provision in UNCLOS.
There are some important differences between the approaches
taken in these treaties. First, the provisions quoted from UNCLOS in the
preceding paragraphs do not include the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibility; however, UNCLOS does provide favorable treat-
ment to developing, geographically disadvantaged states and to coastal
states whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the resources
in their EEZ.123 This favorable treatment does not exempt the states from
limits and does not extend to the high seas, and thus, it is consistent with
the overall conservation goals of the treaty.124 In addition, UNCLOS ar-
ticles purport to bind all states, not just parties.125 The UNFCCC, however,
includes the principle of common but differentiated responsibility in a
form that is inconsistent with the treaty’s purpose,126 and it purports to
bind only parties.127
The differences between UNCLOS and UNFCCC discussed in the
previous paragraphs were made sharper in the next level of agreements.
For UNCLOS the next treaty is the Agreement for the Implementation
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,128 and for the
UNFCCC it is the Kyoto Protocol. It is the thesis of this article that some
of the innovative approaches taken in UNCLOS and the UNFSA could be
adapted to strengthen the global climate change regime to make it more
likely that the objective stated in UNFCCC of “stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”129 will be achieved.
122 Id. art. 4(2)(b).
123 UNCLOS, supra note 105, art. 62(3).
124 Id. art. 70.
125 Id. art. 87.
126 See supra notes 36–88 and accompanying text.
127 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 23.
128 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter UNFSA].
129 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 2.
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The following section analyzes the innovative approaches of the UNFSA
and explores their viability under international law for adaptation in a
global climate change regime.
IV. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES IN UNFSA TO PREVENT A TRAGEDY
OF THE COMMONS
The objective of UNFSA “is to ensure the long-term conservation
and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks . . . .”130 As the following discussion demonstrates, UNFSA adopts
some unconventional means to achieve this objective. The preamble itself
presages some of these progressive methods, which are fleshed out and
included in the articles of the treaty. Consider the following provision in
the preamble: “Calling for more effective enforcement by flag States, port
States and coastal States of the conservation and management measures
adopted for such stocks . . . .”131 This provision anticipates two themes that
are developed and adopted in articles of the treaty. The first is that en-
forcement of treaty requirements will be a major mechanism for achieving
collective action.132 The second is that the once exclusive authority of flag
states over ships flying their flags on the high seas133 will now be shared
with port states and coastal states.134
UNFSA defines “States Parties” as “States which have consented
to be bound by this Agreement and for which the Agreement is in force.”135
The treaty, however, specifies some important obligations and rights in
terms of “States” rather than “States Parties.” For example, when stat-
ing the general principles of the treaty, it is States, not States Parties,
that are required to “adopt measures to ensure long-term sustainability
of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and promote
the objective of their optimum utilization.”136 The term “States Parties” is
130 UNFSA, supra note 128, at art. 2.
131 Id. at preamble.
132 Id. at preamble, art. 20–21.
133 See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 105, at art. 92(1) (“Ships shall sail under the flag of one
State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties
or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”);
Bratspies, supra note 102, at 213 (“The flag state enjoys exclusive sovereignty and juris-
diction over its vessels, and a ship navigating the seas may sail only under the flag of the
nation in which it is registered.”) and references cited therein.
134 See infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
135 UNFSA, supra note 128, at art. 1(2)(a).
136 Id. art. 5(a).
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not used in the article at all. The same is true of the article implementing
the “precautionary principle.”137 This choice of language was deliberate;
it evidences an unarticulated premise on which UNFSA is based: namely,
that treaties can bind non-parties. This unarticulated assumption is the ba-
sis for articles in the treaty that are necessary to accomplish its objective,
which is “to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks . . . .”138
The first article based on this unarticulated assumption that
treaties can bind non-parties is article 3, which states in part: “[T]his
Agreement applies to the conservation and management of straddling
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks beyond areas under national
jurisdiction . . . .”139 Giving effect to this provision would mean that these
fish stocks are no longer an unregulated commons as they were under
the freedom of the seas doctrine that was incorporated into UNCLOS as
follows: “No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high
seas to its sovereignty.”140 Article 3 of UNFSA, thus, is an attempt by the
Conference of Parties to claim a power which none of its members possess.
Without this power, UNFSA cannot achieve its objective unless all states
that fish the high seas become parties.
The next critical article based on the unarticulated assumption
that treaties can bind non-parties is article 7, which prescribes the con-
servation and management measures to be applied to these fish stocks.141
All states, both coastal and those fishing on the high seas, are to be regu-
lated as follows: “Conservation and management measures established for
the high seas and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall
be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety.”142
This compatibility is to be achieved by conforming the conservation and
management measures for the high seas to those of the coastal states:
“States shall . . . ensure that measures established in respect of such
stocks for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of [coastal
137 Id. art. 6; see Phillip M. Kannan, The Precautionary Principle: More than a Cameo
Appearance in United States Environmental Law?, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
409, 409–10 (2007) (describing the precautionary principle as “a risk management theory
that elaborates on the simple command ‘show me’ ”).
138 Id. art. 2.
139 Id. art. 3.
140 UNCLOS, supra note 105, at art. 89.
141 UNFSA, supra note 128, at art. 7.
142 Id. art. 7(2).
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states’ conservation and management] measures.”143 If the States are un-
able to agree on compatible measures, any concerned State may invoke
the dispute settlement procedure.144 This procedure makes the dispute-
settlement provisions of Part XV of UNCLOS applicable to parties of
UNFSA even if such parties are not parties to UNCLOS.145
Article 8 is also based on the unarticulated premise that treaties
can bind non-parties. It requires coastal States and other States that fish
for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks to pursue coop-
eration through either a regional fisheries management organization or
a direct agreement.146 To encourage this collective action, a high price is
put on failure to reach an agreement: “Only those States which are mem-
bers of such an organization or participants in such an agreement, or
which agree to apply the conservation and management measures estab-
lished by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to the fish-
ery resources to which those measures apply.”147 This provision is intended
to assure that all States that fish for these fish stocks are bound by the
same conservation and management measures. The provision is imple-
mented by an injunction to all states:
A State which is not a member of a subregional or region-
al fisheries management organization or is not a partici-
pant in a subregional or regional fisheries management
arrangement, and which does not otherwise agree to apply
the conservation and management measures established
by such organization or arrangement . . . shall not authorize
vessels flying its flag to engage in fishing operations for
the straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks
which are subject to the conservation and management mea-
sures established by such organization or arrangement.148
When this mandate is coupled with the requirements of article 7, discussed
above (that those measures must be compatible to those of the coastal
states),149 the result is, in effect, to make coastal states’ conservation
143 Id. art. 7(2)(a).
144 Id. art. 7(4).
145 Id. art. 30(2).
146 UNFSA, supra note 128, at art. 8(1).
147 Id. art. 8(4).
148 Id. art. 17(2).
149 See supra notes 142–145 and accompanying text.
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and management measures the collective response to the risk of over-
exploitation of these fish stocks. By use of the term “States” rather than
“Parties” in these articles, the treaty purports to bind non-parties. One
commentator summarized the effects of these articles as follows:
When read together, Articles 8 and 17 of the Agreement
purport to impose conservation obligations on all ves-
sels—even those whose flag state is party to neither the
Straddling Stock Agreement nor the RFO [Regional
Fisheries Organization] under which the conservation
obligations arise. Any vessels that refuse to comply with
obligations its flag state has not assumed (and may even
be presumed to have rejected) on their behalf will be ex-
cluded from the fisheries.150
As the discussion above demonstrates,151 fundamental provisions
in UNFSA rest on the unarticulated premise that a treaty can be made
to bind non-parties. If that premise is valid under international law, it
could be a powerful means to include in treaties to control global climate
change. However, the legal validity of the premise is highly doubtful.
The premise that treaties can be binding on non-parties is a devi-
ation from usual principles of international law. For example, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “A treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”152 This prin-
ciple is referred to as the pacta tertiis rule.153 The premise in UNFSA also
appears to be inconsistent with the intent of UNCLOS, which is, as re-
flected in the following article, to leave the high seas beyond the control
of all sovereigns: “No State may validly purport to subject any part of the
high seas to its sovereignty.”154
Professor Erik Franckx, Director of the Center for International
Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, after noting that the pacta tertiis rule is
a well-established principle of international law, thoroughly analyzed the
provisions in UNFSA that arguably could be in conflict with this rule. For
150 Bratspies, supra note 102, at 239.
151 See supra notes 135–147 and accompanying text.
152 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980).
153 See, e.g., Erik Franckx, Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 53 (2000).
154 UNCLOS, supra note 105, at art. 89.
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example, regarding article 8(4) which purports to restrict access to fishery
resources as discussed above,155 Professor Franckx concluded: “Because
of [article 8(4)’s] novel character, this provision appears to reflect pro-
gressive development rather than codification of present day interna-
tional law. As a consequence, even though the Article in question only
uses the term ‘States,’ its application remains restricted to the parties to
the 1995 Agreement [UNFSA].”156 After his analysis of the novel provi-
sions in UNFSA, Professor Franckx concluded:
This Article cannot but reach the conclusion that the 1995
Agreement [UNSFA] as a violation of the pacta tertiis rule
appears not totally convincing. On the contrary, a careful
analysis seems to demonstrate that this Agreement does
not create obligations for third states, but only for states
parties, i.e., those states which have consented to be bound
by the 1995 Agreement and for which this document en-
tered into force.157
The attempt in article 8(4) of UNFSA to bind non-parties failed
because it was not based on customary international law and was not the
implementation of any provision in UNCLOS. However, the drafters of
UNFSA were more successful in binding non-parties in article 21. It is
the approach used there that holds promise for use in the regime to pre-
vent global climate change.
Article 21 reflects a process Professor Geoffrey Palmer calls
prolepsis.158 The word “prolepsis” means: “Anticipation as [for example]
the representation or assumption of a future act or development as if
presently existing or accomplished.”159 Professor Palmer explains the
possibility of using prolepsis to change the unanimous consent rule for
creating norms, which is customary international law, as follows:
Procedures for the creation of norms are agreed upon.
Those procedures include a provision that in respect of
155 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
156 Franckx, supra note 153, at 63.
157 Id. at 71–72.
158 Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 259, 273 (1992).
159 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/prolepsis.
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certain rules or in certain circumstances unanimous con-
sent is not required. The norms created by using the pro-
cedures did not necessarily receive unanimous consent but
are binding on any nation that did not consent because they
were created by agreed procedures. Nations thus consent in
advance to be bound by norms whose content is unknown
at the time of the consent.160
The key concept in Palmer’s definition of prolepsis is that states
agree on “procedures for the creation of norms.”161 This reflects the idea in-
cluded in the definition of prolepsis of anticipation of future development.
Once the norm-creating procedure is agreed to by states, when it is applied
to create a norm, all states that consented to the procedure are bound by
the norm, whether or not they agree with it.
Article 21 of UNFSA illustrates the theory of prolepsis. Article 21
anticipates that certain areas of the high seas will be subject to agree-
ments under subregional or regional fisheries management organizations
or equivalent arrangements.162 The parties to UNFSA concluded that, to
enforce conservation and management measures in these agreements, it
would be necessary that these agreements include a procedure that au-
thorized parties to these agreements to board and inspect vessels on the
high sea flagged to parties to UNFSA whether or not the flag state was a
party to the subregional or regional fisheries management organization or
equivalent arrangement.163 Article 21 then requires the following: “States
shall establish, through subregional or regional fisheries management or-
ganizations or arrangements, procedures for boarding and inspection pur-
suant to [article 21(1)].”164 Thus, parties to UNFSA through article 21(1)
agreed, in advance of the existence of agreements under the subregional
or regional fisheries management organization or equivalent arrangement,
to be bound by the boarding and inspection provisions such agreements
160 Palmer, supra note 158, at 273.
161 Id. The Administrative Procedure Act provides an analogue in U.S. law in which rule-
making is the counterpart to norm making. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006); see also Phillip
M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213,
213–14 (1996) (analyzing rule-making procedures under the Administrative Procedure
Act). Rules, which are within an agency’s delegation from Congress, have the force and
effect of law if issued in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
162 UNSFA, supra note 128, at art. 21.
163 Id. art. 21(1).
164 Id. art. 21(2).
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contain whether or not they agree with them. Professor Franckx arrived
at this same conclusion regarding article 21(1):
The fact remains that states, party to the 1995 Agreement
[UNFSA] will nevertheless be bound by regional measures
to which they have not agreed. But how can one pretend
to violate a basic principle of international law [i.e., pacta
tertiis] if one has voluntarily agreed beforehand to change
that very same principle?165
In summary, the lessons learned from the above analysis of the
regime to protect straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
on the high seas are the following: first, a treaty provision that purported
to impose binding greenhouse gas emission limits on states that are not
parties to the treaty probably would not be enforceable. This follows from
the analysis of article 8(4) of the UNFSA.166 Second, introduction of the
concept of prolepsis into the global climate change regime could convert
the static common but differentiated responsibility provision in the glob-
al climate change regime into a dynamic process adequate to respond to
the dynamic nature of the economic, ecological, and social forces causing
the problem.167
To facilitate the application of the second of these lessons learned to
the problem of global climate change resulting from greenhouse gas pollu-
tion, this article explores the use of prolepsis to mitigate the environmen-
tal harm of a different air pollutant, namely, ozone depleting substances.
V. THE USE OF PROLEPSIS IN THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL TO
PREVENT A TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Ultraviolet radiation (“UV-B”) from the sun enters the Earth’s
atmosphere in the stratosphere.168 Some of the ultraviolet radiation is
absorbed there by ozone.169 This absorption destroys the ozone molecule,
but under normal conditions the destruction is offset: “An equilibrium is
maintained, however, by a series of chemical reactions that create ozone
165 Franckx, supra note 153, at 65 (internal citations omitted).
166 See supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
168 Ozone Layer Protection Glossary, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ozone/defns.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2012).
169 DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 527–28
(2d ed. 2002).
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as a counterbalance to the ozone destroyed through absorption of UV-B
radiation.”170 If the concentration of ozone in the stratosphere is reduced,
the equilibrium is upset and less ultraviolet radiation will be absorbed
there, and more of it will reach the lower atmosphere and the Earth’s
surface.171 Such increases in UV-B radiation cause harm to human health
and to the environment.172 The adverse effects on human health are
“increased skin cancers, cataracts and sunburns” and the “suppress[ion
of] the immune systems in humans with respect to some diseases.”173
Also, UV-B radiation reduces plants and marine phytoplankton; these
effects ripple through ecosystems to produce further harm.174
A group of chemicals called ozone depleting substances, including,
for example, chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), can cause the destruction of
ozone in the stratosphere.175 If these substances are emitted into the at-
mosphere, they can travel to the ozone layer and interfere with the equi-
librium discussed in the previous paragraph, which will lead to the harm
discussed there. To mitigate this risk, the international community nego-
tiated the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which
set up an administrative structure for scientific studies, data collection,
and technology development, but which imposed no limits on the emission
of ozone depleting substances.176 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer was negotiated for that purpose.177
170 Id. at 528.
171 Id. at 528–29.
172 Benefits of the CFC Phase Out, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ozone/geninfo/benefits.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Benefits of the CFC Phase Out]. For an exhaustive
analysis of the costs and benefits of the U.S. ozone protection program, including the health
and environmental effects, see EPA, STRATOSPHERIC OZONE ASSESSMENT, APPENDIX G,
G-16 (for example, estimating: “melanoma and non-melanoma skin cancers—6.3 million
lives saved from skin cancer between 1990 and 2165”), available at http://www.epa.gov
/cleanairactbenefits/1990-2010/ch_apg.pdf.
173 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 169, at 530–31.
174 Id. at 531.
175 Benefits of the CFC Phase Out, supra note 172.
176 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
177 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol], available at http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification
_status/montreal_protocol.shtml. Many of the ozone depleting substances controlled by
the Montreal Protocol are powerful greenhouse gases. For an analysis of the Montreal
Protocol and how it might be used directly to mitigate global climate change, see Mark
W. Roberts & Peter M. Grabiel, A Window of Opportunity: Combating Climate Change
by Amending the Montreal Protocol to Regulate the Production and Consumption of HFCs
and ODS Banks, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 99 (2009).
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The Montreal Protocol set limits on the production and consumption
of a broad group of ozone depleting substances; they are called controlled
substances in the protocol.178 For example, for the year beginning seven
months after the protocol entered into force, parties could not exceed their
1986 level of consumption of a specified group of controlled substances, and
by July 1, 1993 they could not exceed eighty percent of their 1986 levels
for these substances.179 Article 2 includes the following procedure, which
applies prolepsis, to reduce the limits if scientific analysis demonstrates
that adjustments are necessary:
The Parties may decide whether . . . adjustments and
reductions of production or consumption of the controlled
substances . . . should be undertaken and, if so, the scope,
amount and timing . . . . In taking such decisions, the
Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement by
consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted,
and no agreement reached, such decisions shall, as a last
resort, be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the
Parties present and voting [representing a majority of
developed and developing Parties].180
In this article, the parties to the Montreal Protocol agreed to a
procedure that would bind all parties, including those that disagreed, to
new limits on the production and consumption of controlled substances.181
Through this process, adjustments were made that ultimately resulted in
the phasing out of production and consumption of the substances con-
trolled by the Montreal Protocol.182
To appreciate how far the international community had pro-
gressed in its understanding that each state must agree to limit its
178 Montreal Protocol, supra note 177, at art. 1 and 2.
179 Id. at art. 2(1) and 2(3). The original text of the Montreal Protocol is available at http://
ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/Treaties/treaty_text.php?treatyID=8.
180 Id. at art. 2(9)(a) and (c).
181 Id. at art. 2.
182 Ozonaction: Building on the Montreal Protocol’s Success and Facing the Challenges
Ahead, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, available at http://www.unep.fr/ozonaction
/information/mmcfiles/3139-e-OASI09_2010andThen.pdf; see also EDITH BROWN WEISS
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 566–73 (2d ed. 2007) (giving a
chronology of the 1990 London Adjustments and Amendments and the Copenhagen
Adjustments and Amendments of 1992 to the Montreal Protocol that ultimately led to the
phase out).
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sovereignty in order to protect global commons, consider article 10 in the
Vienna Convention. Here, the parties agreed that annexes were limited
to scientific, technical, and administrative matters.183 For the Vienna
Convention, annexes could be adopted by a two-thirds majority,184 and for
any protocol under the Vienna Convention, they could be adopted by a
three-fourths majority.185 However, in both cases, any party that did not
agree with an annex adopted under these procedures could opt out.186
The inclusion of the proleptic provision in article 9 of the Montreal
Protocol with no opt out possibility reflects the ecological reality that one
party can act as a spoiler and negate the efforts and achievements of all
the other parties.187 The prolepsis in article 9 makes the Montreal Protocol
a dynamic agreement that can make real time adjustments in standards
when data and scientific analysis indicate a need. It enables the parties
to continue the precautionary approach that they embraced when they
negotiated mandatory limits on CFCs even though the scientific evidence
was incomplete.188 This, in turn, enables the parties to prevent harm, not
merely react to it. It is exactly this power that is absent from the global cli-
mate change regime.189 It allows spoilers to arise and even guarantees
their right to continue to be spoilers.190
The Montreal Protocol is proof that the international communi-
ty can develop universal norms when it recognizes that it faces a risk
that can be mitigated only by binding all states. The challenge is to
introduce that reality into the global climate change regime. As the
discussion regarding straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks as well as the analysis of the convention and protocol for protect-
ing the ozone layer illustrate, this can be accomplished by adopting the
proleptic approach.
183 Vienna Convention, supra note 176, at art. 10(1).
184 Id. art. 10(2)(a).
185 Id. art. 9(3).
186 Id. art. 10(2)(b).
187 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 177, at art. 9.
188 See Phillip M. Kannan, The Precautionary Principle: More than a Cameo Appearance
in United States Environmental Law?, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 409, 429
(2007) (“[T]he parties to [the Montreal Protocol] did not wait for scientific certainty that
several chemicals were causing the depletion of the ozone layer before accepting binding
obligations to eliminate their production and consumption.”).
189 See UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 3 (omitting this type of constraint in its principles
provision).
190 See id.
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VI. MAKING THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME DYNAMIC
The global climate change regime has been on a collision course
with itself from the beginning. First, it adopted the objective of “stabili-
zation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system”191 but failed to impose an overall limit on greenhouse gas emis-
sions or individual limits on all emitters.192 Second, it incorporated the
precautionary principle193 but renounced the authority to take necessary
action in the face of threats of serious or irreversible damage by adopting
the Berlin Mandate which guaranteed non–Annex I Parties that emission
limits for greenhouse gases would not be imposed on them.194 This section
explores ways to resolve these internal inconsistencies and make the re-
gime dynamic, responsive, and effective in achieving its stated objective.
The first step that must be taken to eliminate these internal in-
consistencies is to repeal the Berlin Mandate and its implementation in
the Kyoto Protocol. Three benefits would be realized from this. First, it
would provide operational freedom to respond to economic and ecological
changes.195 This would increase the probability that greenhouse gas emis-
sions actually will be reduced.196 Second, it would remove a major politi-
cal obstacle impeding U.S. support. The argument that any reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions would be offset by increased emissions from
China and India would be taken away.197 Finally, it would deprive oppo-
nents of the United States accepting a binding limit on greenhouse gas
emissions of the argument that doing so would put the United States at
an economic disadvantage relative to China, India, and other states with
large, rapidly expanding economies.198
191 Id. at art. 2.
192 See generally id. at art. 3.
193 Id. at art. 3(3); see also Kannan, supra note 137.
194 See supra notes 48–82 and accompanying text.
195 See, e.g., PARKER ET AL., supra note 87, at 6–8 (noting the Bush Administration’s
criticism of the Kyoto Protocol as being costly, inflexible, and, due to its exemption of
China and other developing countries from its provisions, lacking comprehensiveness).
196 See id. at 8–9 (noting President Bush’s outline for a new approach to climate change,
including focus on global participation along with the promotion of economic growth). 
197 See, e.g., Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, (2007) (stating “[the EPA took the position that]
predicted increases in greenhouse gas emissions from developing nations, particularly
China and India, [were] likely to offset any marginal domestic decrease [resulting from
regulating new vehicle greenhouse gas emissions]”).
198 See, e.g., PARKER ET AL., supra note 87, at 7 (“In a June 11, 2001 speech on global climate
change, the President stated that the Kyoto Protocol was ‘fatally flawed in fundamental
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The next step is to use the freedom created by repealing the Berlin
Mandate to negotiate an amendment to the UNFCCC that makes the
global climate change regime dynamic. An article incorporating the pro-
leptic principle should be added. In this article the parties would specify
the conditions under which a non–Annex I Party would be reclassified as
an Annex I state and the conditions under which a reclassified state
would become an Annex B state under the Kyoto Protocol.199 These condi-
tions would include quantitative standards; for example, they could in-
clude a stated number of tons of greenhouse gases emitted in a year or
a percentage of the total global emissions for a year which would trigger
reclassification. The quantitative threshold would have to be set at a lev-
el that assured that the cumulative effect of all the emissions below the
threshold would not pose a significant risk to the global climate.200 To put
this condition in other terms, the threshold must be set so that if the green-
house gas emissions of all non–Annex I Parties approached the threshold,
the cumulative effect would not be significant.
This new article would also give the Conference of Parties201 the
power to set implementation schedules, to decide whether there would be
sources to help fund the costs of implementing the cap, to decide whether
there would be subsidized technology transfers, to establish the percent-
age increase or decrease of greenhouse gas emissions to be achieved, and
to establish base years from which the increases or decreases must be
measured. All of the decisions, including the listing actions, would be
made based on a procedure spelled out in the amendment. One element
of the procedure would be that all parties agreed to be bound by a super
majority standard, not a unanimous vote standard.
ways.’ A primary flaw outlined by the President was the exemption of China and other
developing countries from its provisions. This ‘comprehensiveness’ concern was closely
followed by ‘cost’ and ‘competitiveness concerns . . . .’ ”).
199 The Kyoto Protocol would have to be amended to reflect the amendments to the
UNFCCC. It would have a provision specifically granting the Conference of Parties of
the UNFCCC authority to set the reduction limits on greenhouse gas emissions for
Annex B parties.
200 This requirement is analogous to the following prerequisite to the issuance of general
permits under the Clean Water Act: “[T]he Secretary may . . . issue general permits . . .
for any category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill material if the
Secretary determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause
only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have
only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2006).
201 See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text.
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Using as a model article 2 of the Montreal Protocol, the amend-
ment could include a first paragraph developed from the following pro
forma version:
(a) The Parties are hereby authorized to decide whether
a non–Annex I Party is to be added to Annex I to the
UNFCCC and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. If a non–
Annex I Party emitted at least X tonnes of greenhouse
gases in either of the two most recent calendar years or if
such party’s greenhouse gas emissions in either of those
years was greater than Y% of the total global greenhouse
gas emissions, the non–Annex I Party shall be included as
an Annex I Party at the first meeting of the Conference of
Parties of the UNFCCC after such data becomes known to
the Secretary and an Annex B party at the first meeting of
the Conference of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol after such
data becomes known to the Secretary. If the Conference of
Parties decides to add a non–Annex I Party to these two
annexes, it will decide all issues directly related to such
listings, including, but not limited to, setting implemen-
tation schedules, deciding whether there will be sources to
help fund the costs of implementing the cap, deciding
whether there will be subsidized technology transfers, es-
tablishing the percentage increase or decrease of green-
house gas emissions to be achieved, and setting base years
from which the increases or decreases must be made. In
taking any decision under this article, including adding a
non–Annex I Party to Annex I and Annex B, the Parties
shall make every effort to reach agreement by consensus.
If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no
agreement reached, such decision shall, as a last resort, be
adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Annex I par-
ties, present and voting, and a two-thirds majority vote of
the non–Annex I Parties, present and voting.
Some other issues that might be relevant to the reclassification
of a party under the amendment proposed above could include a schedule
for ending eligibility of the party under consideration to benefit from clean
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development mechanisms,202 the date on which the reclassified party could
begin trading emission reduction units,203 the date at which eligibility for
funding under the funding mechanism would end, and the date on which
contribution to the funding mechanism would begin,204 and issues regard-
ing technology transfer.205 All such decisions would have to be taken in ac-
cordance with the procedure given in the proposed article.
The next paragraph in the article in the proposed amendment
would specify a mandatory dispute settlement procedure. This provision
would also be based on prolepsis. It would be modeled on the dispute set-
tlement procedures in UNCLOS and UNFSA; however, instead of a lim-
ited scope of application, it would have an expansive jurisdictional reach.
UNFSA specifically adopts and incorporates the procedures of the
settlement of disputes in UNCLOS.206 The operative provision in UNCLOS
is the following: “Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpre-
tation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been
reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party
to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this
section.”207 Parties to the convention must have selected “the court or
tribunal having jurisdiction” when they signed, ratified, or acceded to
UNCLOS.208 The limitations imposed by section 3, which are explicitly
adopted in UNFSA,209 limit the compulsory binding dispute settlement
procedure in UNFSA to the narrow set consisting of disputes pertaining
202 Under this mechanism, an Annex I Party can invest in an emission reduction project
to be carried out in a non–Annex I state. Some percentage of the certified emission re-
ductions that result from the project can be applied by the Annex I Party toward complying
with its cap. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 12; see Breidenich et al., supra note 46, at
325 (discussing the history of article 12 and its use).
203 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 6. See also David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap
Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 1, 31 (1998) (discussing emissions trading and some of the complexity it creates).
204 See UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 11 (discussing financial mechanisms for UNFCCC).
205 Id. art. 4(1)(c); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 11(2)(b); see also Lorelyn Hall,
Technology Transfer under United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 59 passim (2005 Yearbook) (discussing technology
transfer obligations).
206 UNFSA, supra note 128, at art. 30(1) (“The provisions relating to the settlement of
disputes set out in Part XV of the [UNCLOS] apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute
between States Parties to this Agreement concerning the interpretation or application
of this Agreement, whether or not they are also Parties to the [UNCLOS].”).
207 UNCLOS, supra note 105, at art. 286.
208 Id. art. 286, 287(1).
209 UNFSA, supra note 128, at art. 32.
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to high seas fisheries.210 Limiting the scope of the procedure to a narrow
set of disputes would not be included in the proposal given below for
adaptation in the global climate change regime.
The second paragraph of the article to be adopted in the amend-
ment to UNFCCC would provide for compulsory procedures for binding
decisions. The following is a pro forma version of the second paragraph:
(b) Any dispute (choose one of the following for the scope of
this provision): [arising from or related to], [directly result-
ing from], or [listed in Appendix W211 regarding] the inter-
pretation or application to paragraph (a) of this article will
be resolved according to the following procedure:
Any such dispute, where no settlement has been reached
within 30 days, shall be submitted at the request of any
party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having juris-
diction under this article. When signing, ratifying, or acced-
ing to this Amendment, a State must choose by means of
written declaration one or more of the following means for
the settlement of disputes: (1) the International Court of
Justice or (2) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance
with Appendix Z.212 If the parties have accepted different
means of dispute settlement, they hereby agree to submit
the dispute to an arbitral tribunal constituted in accor-
dance with Appendix Z.
In paragraph (b) as in paragraph (a) the parties agree to limit
their sovereignty by accepting a procedure and binding themselves to the
outcome that results when the procedure is engaged even if they disagree
with the outcome. They accept norm-producing procedures whose norms
are binding on all parties to the treaties.
Including in the climate change regime the dynamics reflected in
the above discussion will be a difficult task. It is evident from the discussion
of the UNFSA that merely including in a treaty an article that purports to
210 Franckx, supra note 153, at 79–80.
211 Appendix W would contain a list of disputes the parties had accepted as the scope of
this provision. If this approach were taken, the article would provide that a two-thirds
majority vote would suffice to make additions and deletions to Appendix W.
212 Appendix Z would define the process for constituting an arbitral tribunal and specify
its rules of procedure.
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bind non-parties will not be effective.213 However, including it in a treaty
to which all states that can pose a significant threat to the global climate
are parties can be effective. The Montreal Protocol provides a model for
achieving such acceptance.
The basic mechanism in the Montreal Protocol for achieving ac-
ceptance can be summarized as follows: Reward parties and penalize
non-parties. Developing parties are rewarded by having their full incre-
mental costs paid from a fund,214 by receiving the best available tech-
nology to facilitate compliance,215 by being granted extended compliance
schedules,216 by being allowed to increase their production and consump-
tion of ozone depleting substances by a stated percentage during these ex-
tended periods,217 and by being a party to protected import-export markets
in ozone depleting substances and possibly products containing ozone de-
pleting substances218 or manufactured using ozone depleting substances.219
Non-parties who do not agree to implement the substantive requirement
of the Montreal Protocol are penalized by being frozen out of these import-
export markets.220
The proposed amendment, discussed above,221 to the global climate
change regime should include the Montreal Protocol’s approach of reward-
ing parties and penalizing non-parties. The kernels of some of these fea-
tures are included in the current regime; for example, UNFCCC calls for
full incremental costs payment to developing parties for compliance222
and establishes a fund from which such payments will be made.223 The
clean development mechanism process in the Kyoto Protocol is a technol-
ogy transfer process.224 What is missing from the current global climate
213 See supra notes 152–157 and accompanying text.
214 Montreal Protocol, supra note 177, at art. 10.
215 Id. art. 10A.
216 Id. arts. 2, 5.
217 Id.
218 Examples of products that might contain ozone depleting substances include automo-
biles, trucks, refrigerators, scientific equipment, and industrial equipment. Examples of
products that might be manufactured using ozone depleting substances include computers.
219 Montreal Protocol, supra note 177, at art. 4 (prohibiting this trade between parties
and non-parties who do not agree to be bound by the provisions of the Montreal Protocol,
but not between parties).
220 Id.
221 See supra notes 199–212 and accompanying text.
222 UNFCCC, supra note 30, at art. 4(3).
223 Id. art. 12.
224 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 12.
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change regime is the other half of the Montreal Protocol formula, namely,
penalizing non-parties.225
The penalty half of the formula should be modeled after that in
the Montreal Protocol; that is, through import and export restrictions that
disadvantage non-parties and reward parties with economic benefits.226
To implement this approach, the parties should agree on a list of products
that parties are prohibited from importing from non-parties. This might in-
clude solar panels, wind turbines, and other equipment used to generate
renewable energy; this would leave such products for use by the nonparty.
The list might include electric energy generated by a nonparty. It could
include vehicles produced by non-parties. There would be a second list
of products that parties could not export to non-parties. This list might
include coal and coal-burning technology that did not meet a best avail-
able technology standard. It might include electric energy generated by
non-renewal technology and vehicles that are not the lowest greenhouse
emitters. Both of these lists would be developed and supplemented by a
vote in the Conference of Parties and would not require a unanimous
consent. In other words, the proleptic principle would be adopted so as
to implement a norm-producing procedure binding on all the parties.
This economic pain to non-parties combined with the economic benefits
to parties should produce by consent what cannot be accomplished by fiat,
namely, universal acceptance of the proposed amendment to the global
climate change regime.
CONCLUSION
The current system attempts to mitigate global climate change by
confronting a dynamic problem with a static response. The climate systems
and the economic systems are constantly changing in complex ways; the
mitigation response is tied to the conditions and assumptions of the late
1980s and early 1990s.227 This presents a fundamental incompatibility be-
tween the causes of the risk and the responses of the international commu-
nity. The only resolution of this conflict is to adopt a different response.
225 Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 52, with Montreal Protocol, supra note 177.
226 See Lakshman Guruswamy, The Promise of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189
(1998) (discussing the use of trade penalties in international environmental agreements).
227 RICHARD SJ TOL, COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS CENTER, AN ANALYSIS OF MITIGATION AS
A RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2009), (discussing early climate change impact
statements), available at http://fixtheclimate.com/component-1/the-solutions-new-research
/mitigation (downloadable PDF located under “Analysis Paper”).
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The first step in changing the response is to make it dynamic. It must be
freed from the ossification based on an impractical version of sovereignty
that empowers any state with significant and sharply increasing levels of
greenhouse gas emissions to foil the collective action of the other states of
the world. It must be continuously changed and continuously improved;
freezing it to the conditions in the 2010s would be just as flawed as freez-
ing it to the 1980s and 1990s. The proleptic principle is the tool that can
make the response dynamic and nimble, that can give it the power of con-
tinuous improvement, and that can give it a chance to succeed.
Substantive standards, such as the caps imposed by Annex B of
the Kyoto Protocol, are critical. Just as critical is the global acceptance of
a norm-making procedure whose norms are binding on all states. This is
a strategy based on prolepsis. The resulting norms often will be substan-
tive. This procedure will require a super majority vote, but not unanimity.
This procedure can be used to determine which states will be added to
the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, what their caps will be, and all other
consequences of this listing. It can be used also to adjust the caps for
states currently in Annex B.
The fatal flaw in the current collective action strategy for miti-
gating global climate change is that some major economies, which emit
significant levels of greenhouse gases, have no cap on those emissions.
Today, China and India are examples.228 In ten years it might be Brazil229
and Indonesia,230 and in twenty years, Mexico.231 A norm-making proce-
dure as developed in this article and summarized in the preceding para-
graph provides the flexibility to adjust the response to fit the changing
economic and scientific realities.
228 Chris Buckley, China Says Emissions Goal Already Tough, No Cap for Now,
REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=
USTRE68S0V720100929; India Gives Cold Shoulder to U.S. on Climate Change Emission
Caps, ABC NEWS (July 19, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/International
/story?id=8122633&page=1.
229 The Business Case for Climate Change: Brazil, ERNST & YOUNG, http://ey.mobi/GL/en
/Services/Specialty-Services/Climate-Change-and-Sustainability-Services/The-business
-case-for-climate-change---Brazil (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
230 Fact Sheet Indonesia, Norway-Indonesia Partnership REDD+, NORWAY—THE OFFICIAL
SITE IN INDONESIA (May 25, 2010), http://www.norway.or.id/PageFiles/404362/FactSheet
IndonesiaGHGEmissionMay252010.pdf.
231 Alex Morales, Mexico Plans Carbon Market for Pemex, Power, Cement Companies,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
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In the classic Humphrey Bogart movie Casablanca,232 the strategy
of Captain Renault of rounding up the usual suspects233 has two flaws that
guarantee its futility; first, innocent parties will be rounded up, and second,
guilty parties will intentionally not be rounded up. The common but differ-
entiated responsibility strategy in the current global climate change re-
gime most definitely does not have the first flaw; however, over time it has
developed a fatal case of the second flaw. Unlike Captain Renault’s effort,
which was intended to fail, the global climate change regime was intended
to succeed. To give it a chance of achieving success, it must be modified to
make it a dynamic system that will round up all likely suspects. Integrating
the principle of prolepsis into that regime offers this possibility.
232 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
233 See Janet H. Murray, Here’s Looking at Casablanca, http://www.dm.gatech.edu
/~murray/casablancaNEHmagazine.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2012); Usual Suspects, THE
PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/the-usual-suspects.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2012).
